The Gambling Commission – Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people. by Davies, Gareth
Report




problem gambling and 
protecting vulnerable people
HC 101 SESSION 2019-20 28 FEBRUARY 2020
A picture of the National Audit Office logo
Our vision is to help the nation spend wisely.
Our public audit perspective helps Parliament hold 
government to account and improve public services.
The National Audit Office (NAO) helps Parliament hold government to account for the 
way it spends public money. It is independent of government and the civil service. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), Gareth Davies, is an Officer of the  
House of Commons and leads the NAO. The C&AG certifies the accounts of all 
government departments and many other public sector bodies. He has statutory 
authority to examine and report to Parliament on whether government is delivering 
value for money on behalf of the public, concluding on whether resources have been 
used efficiently, effectively and with economy. The NAO identifies ways that government 
can make better use of public money to improve people’s lives. It measures this impact 
annually. In 2018 the NAO’s work led to a positive financial impact through reduced 
costs, improved service delivery, or other benefits to citizens, of £539 million.
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
Ordered by the House of Commons 
to be printed on 26 February 2020
This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the 
National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of 
Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act
Gareth Davies 
Comptroller and Auditor General 
National Audit Office
20 February 2020





This report examines the extent to which gambling regulation 
effectively and proportionately protects people from 
gambling‑related harms and addresses emerging risks, 
based on established principles of good regulation. It focuses 
on the role and work of the Gambling Commission, but also 
considers the wider regulatory framework it operates within.
© National Audit Office 2020
The material featured in this document is subject to 
National Audit Office (NAO) copyright. The material 
may be copied or reproduced for non‑commercial 
purposes only, namely reproduction for research, 
private study or for limited internal circulation within 
an organisation for the purpose of review. 
Copying for non‑commercial purposes is subject 
to the material being accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement, reproduced accurately, and not 
being used in a misleading context. To reproduce 
NAO copyright material for any other use, you must 
contact copyright@nao.org.uk. Please tell us who you 
are, the organisation you represent (if any) and how 
and why you wish to use our material. Please include 
your full contact details: name, address, telephone 
number and email. 
Please note that the material featured in this 
document may not be reproduced for commercial 
gain without the NAO’s express and direct 
permission and that the NAO reserves its right to 
pursue copyright infringement proceedings against 
individuals or companies who reproduce material for 
commercial gain without our permission.
Links to external websites were valid at the time of 
publication of this report. The National Audit Office 
is not responsible for the future validity of the links.
007713 02/20 NAO
The National Audit Office study team 
consisted of: 
Simran Nijjar, Ivan O’Brien and 
Rich Sullivan‑Jones, with assistance 
from Naimah Choudhury and 
Umut Yilmaz, under the direction 
of Charles Nancarrow.
This report can be found on the  
National Audit Office website at  
www.nao.org.uk
For further information about the 
National Audit Office please contact:
National Audit Office 
Press Office 












The purpose and aim 
of gambling regulation 13
Part Two
Identifying and responding 
to gambling‑related harm 17
Part Three
Acting to keep consumers safe 23
Part Four
Responding to social and 
technological change 35
Appendix One
Our audit approach 41
Appendix Two
Our evidence base 44
If you are reading this document with a screen reader you may wish to use the bookmarks option to navigate through the parts. If 
you require any of the graphics in another format, we can provide this on request. Please email us at www.nao.org.uk/contact‑us
4 Key facts Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people
Key facts
£11.3bn
total gross gambling yield 
(bets placed less winnings 
paid out) earned by gambling 
operators in Great Britain 
in 2018-19, excluding the 
National Lottery
57%
real-terms increase in gross 
gambling yield between 
2008-09 and 2018-19 
(excluding the National 
Lottery), mostly due to a 




estimate of the number 
of problem gamblers in 
Great Britain, of which 
55,000 are aged 11 to 16
1.8 million estimated number of at‑risk gamblers, who therefore 
may be experiencing some negative consequences 
£260 million –
£1.16 billion
indicative range of extra costs to various public services 
estimated to be associated with problem gamblers
44% proportion of online gamblers that used mobile phones 
to gamble in 2018, up from 23% in 2015
56% estimated increase in gambling operators' spend on 
advertising and marketing from 2014 to 2017, mostly 
from increases in online and social media advertising
£19 million total funding for the Gambling Commission in 2018‑19 
(excluding its work on the National Lottery), almost all 
from licence fees paid by gambling operators 
£19.6 million total value of fi nancial penalties sanctioned by the Gambling 
Commission against gambling operators in 2018‑19, up from 
£1.4 million in 2014‑15
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Summary
1 Around half of adults in Britain participate in some form of gambling. People 
gamble when they pay to engage in a game of chance and win a prize of monetary 
value, including in arcade games, online bingo, casinos or betting on sports. Gambling 
is a major industry in Great Britain, which generated £11.3 billion of yield (bets placed 
less winnings paid out) for gambling operators, excluding the National Lottery, 
in 2018‑19. The industry also raises around £3 billion a year in gambling duty.
2 Gambling can have significant adverse effects on people, particularly when it 
becomes addictive. These effects include mental health problems (which can also 
be a cause of gambling problems), relationship difficulties, large‑scale financial loss 
and, in some cases, crime or suicide. The level and range of harms experienced differ 
from one person to the next and can be made worse by poor or negligent conduct 
from gambling operators, for example by encouraging people to play more. ‘Problem 
gambling’ is gambling considered disruptive and harmful to a person’s health and 
well‑being. Harm from gambling is not restricted to problem gamblers, and can also 
affect other gamblers, friends, family, co‑workers and anyone else impacted by a 
person’s gambling.
3 The Gambling Commission (the Commission) regulates commercial gambling 
in Great Britain. All gambling operators must have a licence, and the Commission 
has powers to set licence conditions and codes of practice, and to monitor and 
enforce compliance with these. It seeks to ensure gambling is fair and safe, and is 
guided by a statutory objective for gambling licensing to protect children and other 
vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling. It also has statutory 
licensing objectives to prevent gambling from being a source of crime and to ensure 
gambling is conducted fairly and openly, a duty to advise government on gambling 
regulation, and separate objectives relating to the operation of the National Lottery. 
The Commission is a non‑departmental public body sponsored by the Department 
for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and is funded by licence fees from 
gambling operators.
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4 To meet its objectives, the Commission works with other public, private and 
charitable bodies:
• DCMS is the government department with overall responsibility for gambling policy 
and the regulatory framework. It introduces legislative changes where necessary, 
sets licence fees and has an objective to ensure commercial gambling is 
socially responsible.
• While the Commission licenses operators at the national level, local authorities 
license and inspect local gambling premises such as betting shops and arcades.
• Specialist treatment to help problem gamblers, as well as most research and 
education, is primarily done by independent charities funded through voluntary 
arrangements by gambling operators.
• The Commission also works with other regulatory and enforcement organisations 
such as the Advertising Standards Authority, which enforces rules relating to 
gambling advertising and promotion.
5 Like many sectors, the gambling industry and the way people gamble are 
influenced by technological and social developments. The industry is larger and 
more accessible than it has ever been, with licensed gambling having grown by 57% 
(£4.1 billion) in real terms over the past decade. This growth is mostly due to a significant 
increase in licensed online and mobile gambling, which did not need to be licensed in 
Britain before November 2014 if it was based overseas. The Commission also monitors 
new risks emerging from areas that are not legally defined as gambling but share similar 
features, such as ‘loot boxes’ in video games.
Scope of this report
6 This report examines the extent to which gambling regulation effectively and 
proportionately protects people from gambling‑related harms and addresses emerging 
risks, based on established principles of good regulation. It focuses on the role and 
work of the Commission, but also considers the wider regulatory framework it operates 
within. It covers whether the Commission:
• has a good understanding of the problems it is trying to address, and has clearly 
set out what it is trying to achieve, so that it can direct resources effectively 
(Part Two);
• is both intervening directly and working effectively with others to make gambling 
safer, based on a good understanding of what works (Part Three); and
• has the powers, capacity and expertise it needs to address emerging risks and 
respond to social and technological changes (Part Four).
7 While we considered the Commission’s overall approach and various objectives 
as part of this review, our evaluation focuses on its licensing objective to protect 
children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling.
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8 Gambling harm is a subject of current public and Parliamentary interest and 
debate. We have not examined the merits of public policy objectives in this area, only 
the extent to which gambling regulation supports these objectives. We have also not 
audited non‑regulatory interventions by other organisations, such as treatment services 
for gambling addiction, although we have considered these factors in context.
Key findings
Identifying and responding to gambling‑related harm
9 There are an estimated 395,000 problem gamblers in Great Britain, with 
1.8 million more gamblers at risk who may also be experiencing harm. Problem 
gamblers typically experience more extreme consequences from gambling, including 
a possible loss of control of their gambling activity. The Commission estimates, based 
on bi‑annual health surveys, that the number of adult problem gamblers is 340,000 
(which has not changed significantly since 2012), with research suggesting that 
around six additional people are directly affected by each problem gambler. There is 
considerable demographic variation: problem gamblers are more likely to be male, 
aged 25 to 34, and from some ethnic minorities. The Commission also estimates 
there are 55,000 problem gamblers aged 11 to 16, nearly twice its previous estimates, 
which is considered to be largely due to changes in how it measures problem gambling 
among young people. The NHS is opening its first gambling clinic for children and 
young people because of concern around the impact of online gaming and gambling 
on young people’s mental health (paragraphs 2.3 to 2.6). 
10 Evidence on the causes and impacts of gambling problems is limited 
compared with other addictions, such as alcoholism, or consumer issues such 
as problem debt. Understanding the causes and impacts of problem gambling on 
people, public services and society is crucial to designing an effective regulatory 
response. Many stakeholders, including Public Health England and the NHS, have 
started to approach gambling‑related harms as a public health matter. However, 
government does not have the same level of evidence on gambling addiction 
compared with public health issues such as obesity and alcohol dependency. 
There is also a lack of longitudinal data to measure the impact of gambling problems. 
One independent estimate indicates extra costs to public services of between 
£260 million and £1.16 billion associated with problem gamblers, but these costs 
are narrowly defined and do not examine causal impacts. The Commission recognises 
the deficiencies, and in July 2018 set out a plan for improving how harms can be 
measured and better understood (paragraphs 2.7 to 2.10).
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11 The Commission is clear in describing its overall aim to make gambling safer 
but has not sufficiently clarified how it is pursuing this aim. Regulators need clear, 
measurable objectives so their teams and the external stakeholders they work with have 
a common understanding of what they are aiming to achieve and can judge progress. 
The Commission has translated its statutory objectives and overall aim to make 
gambling safer into strategic priorities, business plan activities and high‑level outcomes 
it wants to achieve. However, it has not yet developed these high‑level outcomes into 
detailed, measurable success criteria against which to judge progress. For example, 
the Commission wants to see the number of people affected by problem gambling to 
reduce significantly but has not articulated what level of reduction, over what period of 
time, would indicate good progress. It has also not articulated in detail how it interprets 
which consumers may be vulnerable and when (paragraphs 2.11 to 2.13).
Acting to keep consumers safe
12 There are gaps in the data and intelligence the Commission uses to identify 
the problems consumers are experiencing with gambling services or operators. 
The Commission monitors intelligence from a range of sources to identify operators or 
games that gamblers are experiencing issues with. It uses this and other information 
to help it identify and prioritise which emerging issues to address. It has increased the 
number of intelligence reports it gathers and receives by 19% since 2014. However, 
there are gaps in the Commission’s intelligence base. For example, it relies on local 
licensing authority inspections for intelligence on gambling premises, but 119 authorities 
did not conduct any inspections in 2018‑19 and around 60 did not conduct any for the 
past three years. The Commission also does not make full use of its own data to identify 
consumer problems, for example from the 33,000 contacts a year it receives from 
consumers (paragraphs 3.3 to 3.6).
13 The Commission has increased enforcement action against operators that 
break rules. In line with good regulatory practice, the Commission uses penalties 
or other sanctions to deter licensed operators from deliberately or inadvertently 
failing to meet licence conditions or codes of practice. Between April 2014 and 
March 2019, the Commission revoked the licence of eight gambling businesses and 
eight senior individuals working in the industry. Over the same period, it enforced 
29 financial penalties. These penalties have increased from three penalties with a 
combined value of £1.4 million in 2014‑15 to nine penalties totalling £19.6 million in 
2018‑19. The Commission does not know the extent to which these increases have 
strengthened the deterrent effect of enforcement action (paragraphs 3.10 and 3.11).
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14 The Commission is not doing as much as it could to incentivise operators 
to raise standards and make gambling safer. Effective regulation not only penalises 
rule‑breaking, but also raises standards across the industry both by strengthening the 
rules where appropriate and by incentivising and supporting companies to go beyond 
minimum standards (paragraphs 3.8, 3.9 and 3.12 to 3.14).
• The Commission acknowledges that some of its licence conditions and codes 
of practice have not been effective at making gambling safer and has made 
incremental improvements since 2015.
• The Commission also seeks to prompt industry to raise standards but has not 
explored common approaches that regulators use in other sectors, such as 
financial or reputational incentives. Industry representatives we interviewed also 
indicated that a more collaborative relationship, and more clarity over what the 
Commission expects of them, would be more effective in raising standards.
15 The Commission is increasingly proactive in working with other 
organisations to protect consumers, as its direct role and powers are limited to 
regulating operators. Effective consumer protection usually involves a number of other 
functions alongside regulation, such as consumer advocacy and complaints services. 
The Commission has therefore worked with other organisations that also seek to make 
gambling safer, and developed a new national strategy in the absence of anything 
similar already existing (paragraphs 3.15 to 3.17).
• In April 2019, the Commission launched its three‑year national strategy to reduce 
gambling harms, which articulates how activities from various organisations 
fit into an overall framework for making gambling safer. Many stakeholders 
we interviewed welcomed the Commission’s efforts to bring key organisations 
together. We also found specific examples of joint working, such as work with 
the Advertising Standards Authority to clarify requirements relating to gambling 
advertising and sponsorship.
• Within the arrangements as currently designed, consumers cannot typically 
seek redress where operators fail to meet social responsibility codes of practice 
(for example, requiring them to help consumers stop gambling for a defined period 
of time when the consumer requests this), as these are not normally reflected 
in operators’ terms and conditions. The Commission has therefore found it 
difficult to consistently direct consumers seeking support or redress to relevant 
organisations. For example, this includes directing consumers with complaints 
towards the appropriate industry‑funded dispute resolution service, of which 
there are eight. There is also no statutory consumer representative organisation, 
as exists in some sectors.
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16 The Commission does not have a full understanding of the impact of its 
work or whether it is achieving its overall objectives to protect consumers. 
Regulators need a good understanding of their performance so they can prioritise 
what works, take corrective action and be held accountable. The Commission generally 
follows good practice in reporting performance to its board. It reports quarterly a set 
of indicators linked clearly to its strategic priorities and includes some measures of 
consumer outcomes, such as estimated numbers of problem gamblers. However, its 
measures are not comprehensive, are not set against clear benchmarks to indicate 
overall performance and do not, for example, assess how effectively the Commission’s 
work reaches consumers most at risk (paragraphs 3.18 to 3.20).
Responding to social and technological change
17 The way that gambling regulation is funded does not allow the Commission 
to change licence fees and makes it more difficult to invest in new skills to quickly 
address changing risks. The Commission received £19 million of funding in 2018‑19, 
almost entirely from licence fees. DCMS sets fees through secondary legislation, which 
normally happens approximately every four years. DCMS and the Commission intend 
for fees to reflect the cost of licensing and regulating the industry, based on the level 
of risk of each licence type and size of operator. Since the last fees review in 2016, 
the Commission has seen increased complexity in its work, particularly in online and 
mobile gambling which account for 83% of the total number of regulatory penalties 
in the past five years. The Commission has identified specific skills gaps, including in 
crypto‑currency and addictive technologies, but cannot change licence fees to raise 
additional resource and also faces more general constraints in reprioritising within 
existing budgets (for example, due to the specific technical skills required). However, 
it has not yet produced a robust assessment of future needs or fully explored what 
more it could do within its existing resources (paragraphs 4.10 to 4.14).
18 The Commission’s ability to respond to changes in gambling is constrained 
by its understanding of how they affect consumers. The Commission needs this 
understanding to determine an appropriate regulatory response. The Commission 
monitors various industry and consumer developments. This has highlighted, for 
example, an increase from 23% to 44% of online gamblers who gamble through mobile 
phones between 2015 and 2018, increasing popularity of gambling related to video 
games by younger people, and a 56% estimated increase in advertising spend from 
2014 to 2017 (mostly from online advertising and social media). The Commission has 
not yet assessed the impact or potential harms of these developments for consumers 
and has recognised it needs to increase its expertise in digital technologies to be able 
to respond more quickly (paragraphs 4.3 to 4.5).
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19 The Commission has taken a cautious approach to changing regulations, 
and some changes have been made via legislation, which has taken a number 
of years. While the Commission’s powers give it considerable scope to change 
requirements on operators in order to meet the licensing objectives, in practice it does 
not always make changes itself. This is either because it lacks powers in specific areas, 
or due to a lack of evidence over what the best regulatory response would be. In some 
cases, legislative changes have been introduced by DCMS and enacted by Parliament. 
For example, legislation in 2019 reduced the maximum stakes on fixed‑odds betting 
terminals (FOBTs) from £100 to £2 per play. The Commission does not have powers 
to change stake limits on gambling machines, but it can take other actions to place 
new requirements on operators, and it also provides advice to government. It advised 
government in 2013 that the industry urgently needed to improve both transparency 
around FOBTs and measures to minimise harm to consumers. The Commission and 
DCMS subsequently introduced new requirements on operators, but the Commission 
considered it did not have evidence to support reducing stakes limits until 2018 
(paragraphs 4.6 to 4.9).
Conclusion
20 Gambling‑related harm is a serious problem for the individual affected and people 
close to them. It imposes potentially significant costs on public services and society 
more widely, although government has a limited understanding of these impacts. 
The Gambling Commission is a small regulator in a challenging and dynamic industry. 
To reduce these harms, it has increased its regulatory action (such as penalties on 
operators that break rules) and its collaboration with others in the field. But there is 
more it needs to do to identify where problems are occurring and ensure gambling 
operators raise their standards.
21 The way people gamble is changing, with new risks emerging in online and 
mobile gambling and other technological developments. The Commission’s ability to 
ensure consumers are protected from these new risks is constrained by factors outside 
its control, including inflexible funding and a lack of evidence on how developments 
in the industry affect consumers. The Commission is unlikely to be fully effective in 
addressing risks and harms to consumers within the current arrangements.
Recommendations
22 The Commission should:
a build on its high-level definition of vulnerability to articulate clearly how it 
interprets which consumers may be vulnerable under what circumstances, 
and how its work is intended to address this. To achieve this, it could work 
with and learn from the experiences of other regulators that have articulated their 
interpretations of vulnerable consumers including, for example, how they consider 
concepts such as temporary vulnerability (such as due to job loss or bereavement); 
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b do more to translate its high-level intended consumer outcomes into what 
they mean in practical terms, to help determine progress in achieving these 
objectives. The Commission should also continue to develop how it measures 
its performance and impact, including in protecting demographic groups that are 
particularly at risk of harm, and assessing the timeliness of its interventions and 
the effectiveness of industry‑led initiatives to protect consumers;
c enhance its analytical capability to better identify consumer harm and make 
greater use of the intelligence it has available. For example, it could develop 
a more systematic and detailed approach to recording and analysing information 
from consumers who make contact. The Commission should also consider 
how it can work with other organisations such as local licensing authorities and 
dispute resolution providers to plug gaps in its current intelligence base; and
d develop a more strategic approach to influencing gambling operators to 
raise standards in protecting consumers. This could include, for example, 
considering ways to place financial or reputational incentives on operators 
to go further in making gambling safer for consumers, including by learning 
from other regulators.
23 The Commission and DCMS should:
e develop a deeper understanding of the causes and impacts of 
gambling-related harm. This should include the Commission’s own research 
programme as well its engagement with the wider research community. It could 
include, in particular, analysis of how social and technological developments 
affect people’s gambling and the impact this is having in practice, particularly to 
at‑risk groups;
f review whether the arrangements for consumers when things go wrong are 
working effectively. This should include consideration of whether simplifying 
dispute resolution services would make it easier and more consistent for 
consumers to access them, and whether it would also provide benefits for the 
Commission by simplifying the insight and intelligence it gathers and receives 
on consumer problems; and
g review the suitability of the current licence fee model, and what it means 
for the regulatory approach, to address the challenges identified in this 
report and ensure that gambling regulation can adapt to changing risks 
to consumers. This includes the ability to quickly respond to new areas of 
consumer harm and, where necessary, increasing capability and capacity to 
address this. It would also be an opportunity to consider ways licence fees 
could be used to create financial incentives on operators to raise standards.
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Figure shows case study 1
Part One
The purpose and aim of gambling regulation
1.1 Around half of adults in Britain participate in some form of gambling. People 
gamble when they pay to engage in a game of chance and win a prize of monetary 
value. There are many ways for people to gamble, including arcade games, online 
bingo, casinos or betting on sports, and each activity has its own unique characteristics. 
The industry raises around £3 billion a year in gambling duty.1
1.2 Gambling can have significant adverse effects on people, particularly when it 
becomes addictive. These effects include mental health problems (which can also 
be a cause of gambling problems), relationship difficulties, large‑scale financial loss 
and, in some cases, crime or suicide (Case study 1). The level and range of harms 
experienced differ from one person to the next, and can be made worse by poor or 
negligent conduct from gambling operators, for example by encouraging people to 
play more.
1.3 ‘Problem gambling’ is gambling considered disruptive and harmful to a person’s 
health and well‑being. Those who are not classified as problem gamblers can also 
experience similar harms, normally to a lesser extent. Harm from gambling is not 
restricted to gamblers themselves – it can also affect friends, family, co‑workers 
and anyone else impacted by a person’s gambling.
1 Gambling duties are general taxation, not a ringfenced levy.
Case study 1
Lee had never gambled until he was 39 years old, when he first went to a casino. He soon became addicted 
to gambling, which led to him spending all of his life savings and borrowing large amounts of money, which 
included unsecured personal loans, credit cards and payday loans. When he could no longer access any 
more money, he stole £19,000 from his employer. He could not see any way out of his dependency other 
than suicide. The only thing that stopped him from this course of action was a call from a family member. 
Source: Young Gamers and Gamblers Education Trust
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1.4 The Gambling Commission (the Commission) regulates commercial gambling 
in Great Britain. All gambling operators must have a licence, and the Commission 
has powers to set licence conditions and codes of practice and to monitor and 
enforce compliance with these. It seeks to ensure gambling is fair and safe, and is 
guided by a statutory objective for gambling licensing to protect children and other 
vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling. It also has statutory 
licensing objectives to prevent gambling from being a source of crime and to ensure 
gambling is conducted fairly and openly, a duty to advise government on gambling 
regulation, and separate objectives relating to the operation of the National Lottery. 
The Commission is a non‑departmental public body sponsored by the Department 
for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and is funded by licence fees from 
gambling operators (£19 million in 2018‑19).
1.5 To meet its objectives, the Commission works with other public, private 
and charitable bodies (Figure 1). This includes DCMS, which is the government 
department with overall responsibility for gambling policy and the regulatory framework. 
DCMS introduces legislative changes where necessary, sets licence fees and has an 
objective to ensure commercial gambling is socially responsible.
1.6 Like many sectors, the gambling industry and the way people gamble are influenced 
by technological and social developments. The industry is larger and more accessible than 
it has ever been, with licensed gambling having grown by 57% (£4.1 billion) in real terms 
over the past decade. This growth is mostly due to a significant increase in licensed online 
and mobile gambling, which did not need to be licensed in Britain before November 2014 
if it was based overseas (Figure 2 on page 16). The Commission also monitors new 
risks emerging from areas that are not legally defined as gambling but share similar 
features. For example, ‘loot boxes’ in video games are sometimes paid for in cash, with 
a reward that is based on chance but not of monetary value and therefore not part of the 
Commission’s regulatory remit.
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Figure 1 shows The gambling regulation framework in Great Britain
Figure 1
The gambling regulation framework in Great Britain
The Gambling Commission works with several other organisations to protect consumers
Notes
1 Regulatory and enforcement bodies are in red, other relevant organisations and people are in grey.
2 There are a range of other non‑regulatory organisations, such as charities and academics, involved in research, education and treatment.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
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Part Two
Identifying and responding 
to gambling‑related harm
2.1 Government and regulators need to understand the scale, nature and impact of the 
problems they are seeking to address in order to design and implement an appropriate 
regulatory response. For example, the Gambling Commission (the Commission) needs 
to understand how many people experience gambling‑related harms and what impact 
this has on individuals, public services and wider society, to ensure its interventions are 
sufficient and targeted. Regulators should also be clear about what they are trying to 
achieve and how they plan to achieve their aims.
2.2 This part examines:
• whether the Commission and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 
(DCMS) have a good understanding of the scale, nature and impact of gambling 
problems; and
• whether the Commission has clearly defined what it is trying to achieve, and how 
it plans to realise its goals.
Understanding the problem
Identifying the number of people affected
2.3 To estimate the number of problem gamblers in Great Britain, the Commission 
contributes specific questions on gambling in three independent health surveys: the 
Health Survey for England, the Scottish Health Survey and the Wales Omnibus Survey. 
It also commissions separate surveys of 11‑ to 16‑year‑olds. These surveys include 
questions on whether people have experienced various negative consequences from 
gambling (such as to their health, financial position or relationships, or resulting in crime), 
or behaviours likely to lead to harm. Those who have experienced a high enough number 
of consequences or behaviours are classified as problem gamblers. Those who 
experience fewer, but still some, consequences are classified as at‑risk gamblers.
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Figure 3 shows Distribution of problem gamblers in Great Britain by age and sex
2.4 The Commission estimates that the number of adult problem gamblers in 
Great Britain is 340,000. The surveys cannot predict the exact number with certainty, 
and the figure could be up to around 100,000 higher or lower. Prevalence rates of 
problem gambling among adults have not changed significantly since 2012 when a 
consistent measurement was introduced. The Commission also estimates that a further 
1,740,000 adults are at risk, and therefore may also be experiencing harm. There is 
significant demographic variation – adult problem gamblers are more likely to be male, 
aged 25 to 34, and from some ethnic minority backgrounds (Figure 3).
2.5 Estimates of the number of children that experience gambling‑related harm have 
risen in recent years. The Commission estimates that there are around 55,000 problem 
gamblers aged 11 to 16 in Great Britain (which could be up to around 20,000 higher or 
lower due to uncertainty in the estimates). A further 85,000 are estimated to be at risk 
and so may also be experiencing harm (meaning a total of around 1.8 million adults and 
children at risk). These estimates are nearly twice as high as the estimates in 2017, which 
is considered to be primarily due to changes in how problem gambling among young 
people is measured. In 2019, the NHS opened its first gambling clinic for children and 
young people amid growing concern around the impact of online gaming and gambling 
on young people’s mental health.
Figure 3
Distribution of problem gamblers in Great Britain by age and sex
Estimated prevalence of problem gamblers (%)
Men aged between 25 and 34 are most likely to be problem gamblers
Note
1 Prevalence figures are the percentage of people in each age and sex grouping estimated to be problem gamblers. 
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Figure shows case study 2
2.6 The Commission’s estimates are useful indicators of the prevalence of gambling 
problems, but also have limitations. The health surveys are every two years, so do not 
provide a fully up‑to‑date picture. They are also a snapshot in time and do not report 
new cases of problem gambling, so it is not possible to tell what proportion of problem 
gamblers are new. The estimates also do not give a full picture of those affected by 
problem gambling other than the gambler. Research in 2017 suggested that around 
six additional people, such as family and friends, are directly affected by every 
problem gambler.2
Understanding the causes and impacts of gambling problems
2.7 To develop an effective regulatory response, it is important for government and 
regulators to understand not just the number of people affected, but also the causes 
and impacts of the problems they are seeking to address. People can experience 
gambling problems for a variety of reasons, and are impacted differently, with some 
developing serious addictions. Understanding the impact of gambling harm on 
individuals, public services and wider society helps to determine the overall scale 
of regulation required to address the issues. It is also important to understand how 
problems occur, including consumer behaviours and operator practices that make 
addiction more likely (Case study 2), so that regulation can be targeted on the most 
significant causes of harm.
2.8 To understand the causes and impacts of gambling harm, the Commission uses 
its own research as well as that from others. The Commission’s research monitors 
participation in gambling activity, and also examines behaviour, awareness and attitudes 
towards gambling among consumers and the wider public. The Commission also 
works in a tripartite arrangement with GambleAware (an independent charity whose 
funding comes from the gambling industry) and the Advisory Board for Safer Gambling 
(which provides independent expert advice to the Commission) to commission 
research. Research is largely commissioned by GambleAware, based on priorities set 
in consultation with the Commission. In 2018‑19, GambleAware spent £2 million on 
research and evaluation.
2 B C Goodwin, M Browne, M Rockloff and J Rose, ‘A typical problem gambler affects six others’, International Gambling 
Studies, vol. 17 issue 2, June 2017, pp. 276–289.
Case study 2
We reviewed online discussion forums and found examples of people who had been contacted by operators 
and encouraged to gamble, including using cash inducements. In some of these examples, the gambler 
had found it difficult to self‑exclude successfully. Generally, the gambler felt mentally low and vulnerable as 
a result of the contact. In the most severe cases, the contact prompted a relapse into problem gambling.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of online messaging boards
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2.9 The availability of evidence on the causes and impacts of gambling problems is 
limited compared with other addictions, such as alcohol dependency, or other consumer 
problems such as problem debt. We found the following:
• Many stakeholders, including Public Health England and the NHS, have started 
to approach gambling‑related harms as a public health matter. However, 
government’s understanding of problem gambling is limited by comparison with 
other addiction‑related areas of public health, such as alcohol dependency and 
obesity. For example, gambling problems are not currently measured in a similar 
way to local alcohol profiles in England, which monitor the impact of alcohol on 
local communities.
• Similarly, data do not currently exist to allow robust measurement of the causal impact 
of problem gambling. In our 2018 report on problem debt, we used longitudinal 
national survey data to model the direct impact of being over‑indebted on people’s 
likelihood to experience anxiety and depression or live in state‑subsidised housing, 
and we estimated the resulting extra cost to public services.3 We have not been able 
to do the same for gambling problems, because no similar longitudinal data exist.
• Independent research does exist and provides the Commission and DCMS with 
some level of insight, but this is limited and presents only a partial picture. For 
example, recent studies have examined areas such as the influence of parental 
attitudes and behaviours on gambling‑related harm in young people and the 
link between problem gambling and suicide. One independent estimate in 2016 
indicated that problem gamblers are associated with between £260 million and 
£1.16 billion a year of extra costs to public services, but this examined only the 
correlation between them and not the causal impact of problem gambling.4
2.10 Public bodies have recognised the limitations of current evidence on 
gambling‑related harms. For example, in 2018 the Commission and the Advisory 
Board for Safer Gambling set out a plan to develop a new approach to how harms 
can be measured and better understood. Their proposed approach intends to improve 
understanding of the full range of social and economic harms gambling can have on 
society, agree a definition of gambling‑related harm, and make recommendations 
about how the societal cost could be estimated. Public Health England is also carrying 
out a separate evidence review on the prevalence of gambling and associated health 
harms, and their social and economic burden. The review is expected to be completed 
in spring 2020 and aims to identify gaps in the evidence base, which will inform the 
direction of future research.
3 Comptroller and Auditor General, Tackling problem debt, Session 2017–2019, HC 1499, National Audit Office, 
September 2018.
4 Institute for Public Policy Research, Cards on the table: The cost to government associated with people who 
are problem gamblers in Britain, December 2016.
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Defining what regulation is intended to achieve
2.11 Like most regulators, the Commission’s statutory objectives are set at a high level. 
Regulators need to interpret their statutory objectives into strategic priorities and define 
clear, measurable aims so that teams across the regulator, and external stakeholders 
they work with, have a common understanding of what they are aiming to achieve 
and can judge progress. Success criteria help stakeholders, including industry, to 
understand the regulator’s expectations and priorities for improvement.
2.12 The Commission is clear in describing its overall aim to make gambling safer. It has 
also translated this and its statutory objectives, including to protect children and other 
vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling objective, into strategic 
priorities, business plan activities and the high‑level outcomes it wants to achieve 
(Figure 4 overleaf).
2.13 While the Commission has articulated its intended consumer outcomes at a high 
level, it has not done the following:
• Developed these high‑level outcomes into detailed, measurable success criteria 
against which to judge progress. For example, for consumers to be free to enjoy 
gambling safely, the Commission wants to see the number of people affected by 
problem gambling to reduce significantly. However, while it recognises that no 
problem gambling at all is unrealistic and outside of its control, it has not articulated 
what level of reduction, over what period of time, would indicate good progress.
• Articulated in detail how it interprets which consumers may be vulnerable and 
when. Vulnerability is difficult to define precisely, as it can depend heavily on 
circumstances, and regulators typically recognise that vulnerable consumers are, 
due to their circumstances, particularly susceptible to harm.
• Established the outcomes it wants to achieve for particular demographics 
it recognises as being most at risk.
• Articulated how its overall focus on safer gambling translates into the work 
of different teams throughout the organisation.
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Figure 4 shows The Gambling Commission’s aims and objectives
Figure 4
The Gambling Commission’s aims and objectives
The Gambling Commission (the Commission) has translated its statutory objectives and overall aim to make gambling safer 
into strategic priorities, business plan activities and intended consumer outcomes
Overall aim The Commission’s latest corporate strategy states that it “exist[s] to safeguard 
consumers and the wider public by ensuring that gambling is fair and safe”.
Strategic priorities Four out of five strategic priorities in the Commission’s corporate strategy support its 
overall aim to make gambling fair and safe (the fifth relates only to the National Lottery):
• protect the interests of consumers;
• prevent harm to consumers and the public;
• raise standards in the gambling market; and
• improve the way the Commission regulates.
Business plan activities In its 2019‑20 business plan, the Commission set out 5–7 activities to support each of 
the above strategic priorities, for example to:
• undertake meaningful consumer research to understand how to best inform 
consumer decision‑making and assist harm prevention;
• assess industry progress on the development of games designs – determining where 
regulatory intervention is required; and
• implement changes to the Licensing Conditions and Codes of Practice to raise 
operator standards in identifying and addressing gambling‑related harms.
High-level 
consumer outcomes
The Commission’s corporate strategy sets out its high‑level aspirations for consumers, 
the wider public, gambling businesses and the Commission itself. For example, it wants 
gambling consumers to be:
• empowered to make informed choices about gambling;
• fully informed of, and able to make use of, their rights; 
• free to enjoy gambling and to feel confident that they will be treated fairly;
• aware of the risks and clear about when and how to seek help or redress; and
• able to differentiate between operators in a competitive market on the basis 
of customer care and values.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Gambling Commission publications
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Part Three
Acting to keep consumers safe
3.1 Good regulation involves intervening in a timely, proportionate and effective 
way, based on good intelligence on where problems are occurring in the market and 
an understanding of whether intervention is having the desired effect. Interventions 
typically include taking enforcement action against firms that break rules, changing 
the rules where gaps are identified and working with others to incentivise the market 
to raise standards in general.
3.2 This part examines:
• the quality of the information the Gambling Commission (the Commission) 
uses to decide whether to intervene or not;
• whether the Commission intervenes effectively to prevent and address 
gambling‑related harms;
• how the Commission works with other organisations to ensure consumers 
are protected; and
• whether the Commission can measure whether gambling regulation is as 
effective as it could be.
Monitoring what is going wrong for consumers
3.3 The Commission collects, analyses and monitors different intelligence sources 
to identify consumer problems in the gambling market. This includes data provided 
on a routine basis by gambling operators, insight provided by external organisations 
such as law enforcement agencies, and developments reported on social media 
(Figure 5 overleaf). The Commission assesses each piece of intelligence as part 
of a prioritisation framework to identify risks to consumers and emerging issues.
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Figure 5
Gambling Commission’s main intelligence sources
Note
1 This is not an exhaustive list of Gambling Commission intelligence sources. 
Source: National Audit Office observation and review of Gambling Commission documents
The Gambling Commission (the Commission) uses a range of sources to identify consumer problems
The Commission gathers, 
analyses and monitors 
trends from different 
intelligence sources
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with industry

















Monitoring news and 
social media channels
Figure 5 shows Gambling Commission’s main intelligence sources
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3.4 The Commission’s insight into consumer problems largely depends on the volume, 
quality and range of intelligence it receives on operator practices and consumer 
experiences. The number of individual intelligence submissions it gathered and received 
between 2014 and 2018 increased by 19%. Most of these submissions were generated 
directly or via intelligence‑sharing systems by Commission staff from the course of their 
daily work, such as financial intelligence officers recording their analysis of data provided 
by a gambling provider.
3.5 However, there are gaps in the Commission’s intelligence base that limits its ability 
to identify and respond effectively to consumer harm:
• The Commission relies on local licensing authority inspections for intelligence 
on licensed gambling premises. These inspections help the Commission to 
understand how national operators’ policies, such as on self‑exclusion or staff 
training, are implemented in practice. There is considerable regional variation, 
with 119 authorities not conducting any inspections in 2018‑19 (Figure 6 overleaf) 
and around 60 not conducting any for the past three years. The Commission’s data 
show that over the past nine years, 89% of inspections were pre‑planned and the 
operators knew they would happen in advance.
• The Commission has limited access to intelligence about online operators based 
overseas who are not licensed and are therefore providing illegal gambling 
services. It relies on information provided by international organisations, such 
as domain hosting companies or payment and software providers, for the 
intelligence it needs to disrupt their activities.
3.6 The Commission also does not make full use of the data it does have to identify 
consumer problems.
• In 2018‑19 its contact centre was contacted by consumers approximately 
33,000 times through email, post and telephone, only around 9,000 of which 
were directly relevant to the Commission’s role. The Commission analyses some 
of the data provided by its contact centre to support policy considerations and 
compliance activity. However, it does not systematically collect and analyse 
detailed data on the problems consumers are contacting them about. For example, 
although a consumer complaint can relate to multiple issues, the Commission only 
records the most prominent issue.
• There is not an ombudsman in the gambling sector, but eight separate dispute 
resolution providers. These providers have data and insight into the problems 
consumers are experiencing and how these are changing over time. Providers 
submit complaints data to the Commission each quarter, but this is at a high level 
and the Commission does not analyse it alongside its own data on a consistent 
basis to provide a complete perspective of consumer problems in the market.
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Figure 6
Licensing authority inspections and visits in Great Britain in 2018‑19
Between April 2018 and March 2019, 119 local licensing authorities did not conduct
any inspections of gambling premises
Note
1 This is based on the number of gambling premises as of May 2019.









 1% – 24.99% 85
 25% – 49.99% 63
 50% – 74.99% 40
 75% – 99.99% 17
 100% + 53
 No gambling premises 3
Figure 6 shows Licensing authority inspections and visits in Great Britain in 2018‑19
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Intervening to protect consumers
Licensing and enforcement
3.7 The Commission has a range of powers and tools to help it achieve its licensing 
objectives, including protecting people from gambling‑related harm. The Commission 
sets the conditions and codes of practice required for an operator to hold a licence, 
and has powers to take enforcement action where these conditions are breached, 
including revoking a licence (Figure 7 overleaf). The Commission has the power to 
investigate whether an offence has been committed under the 2005 Gambling Act and 
may institute criminal proceedings if it deems it appropriate. Regulators use enforcement 
against rule‑breaking as an important deterrent to discourage other companies from 
breaking rules and causing further harm.
3.8 The Commission can make amendments or additions to the licence conditions 
and codes of practice, to reflect the risks to consumers it has identified and emerging 
evidence on the most effective means of tackling those risks. It does this through a 
process of consultation with stakeholder groups, including consumer and industry 
representatives. The Commission acknowledges that some of its licence conditions 
and codes have not been effective at making gambling safer, and has been making 
incremental improvements (Figure 8 on page 29).
3.9 We examined two examples of the Commission’s recent changes to licence 
conditions as case studies, to consider how timely they were in minimising the risk of 
consumer harm. In these case studies, we found there were a few years between the 
Commission first recognising weaknesses in how well the existing rules minimised 
consumer harm and changing licence conditions or codes of practice to address 
this harm (Case study 3).
Case study 3
In October 2018, the Gambling Commission updated its licence conditions and codes of practice to reduce 
the potential for consumers to be misled by terms and practices relating to online bonus promotions, and 
to stop operators preventing customers from withdrawing funds from their accounts. The Commission first 
identified weaknesses with the previous licence conditions in 2015, three years before changes took effect. 
During this time, it undertook joint work with the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate how online 
gambling companies were treating their customers in terms of fairness and transparency.
In October 2019, the Commission introduced changes to improve the effectiveness of codes of practice that 
set out how operators should identify and interact with customers who may be at risk of, or experiencing, 
gambling problems. The Commission established that the previous codes were not sufficiently effective in 
2017, two years before changes took effect.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Gambling Commission information
Figure shows case study 3
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Licensing
Figure 7
Gambling Commission’s enforcement powers
The Gambling Commission has powers to grant licences to operators, investigate compliance with licence conditions
and enforce against breaches of these conditions
Source: Gambling Commission analysis of its powers
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ComplianceEnforcement
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Figure 7 shows Gambling Commission’s enforcement powers
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Figure 8
Gambling Commission consultations on regulatory changes
The Gambling Commission (the Commission) has consulted seven times since 2015 on changes to licence conditions
and codes of practice intended to make gambling safer
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Gambling Commission consultations
Controlling where gaming machines may be played
New social responsibility code provision to ensure that 
facilities for gambling are provided in a manner that 
protects children and other vulnerable persons from 
being harmed.
2015
2017 Remote gambling and software technical standards
New rules around customer access to view their account 
gambling history and the display of the currency value of 
each transaction.
2019 Changes to licence conditions and codes of practice on 
alternative dispute resolution, customer interaction, and 
research, prevention and treatment contributions
Clarification of the outcomes the Commission expects 
licensees to meet when interacting with consumers, 
and additional requirements for operators to name only 
alternative dispute resolution providers who meet the 
Commission’s additional standards.
Placing digital adverts responsibly
Introduce a new licence condition requiring operators to 
take responsibility for preventing digital adverts including 




Amendments to the social responsibility provisions, 
including the introduction of mandatory test purchasing 
to prevent underage gambling and implementation of 
self‑exclusion schemes.
2015
Changes to licence conditions and codes of practice 
linked to the fair and open licensing objective
Changes relate to marketing and advertising, unfair terms 
and the handling of customer complaints and disputes.
2018
Changes to the licence conditions and codes of practice 
on age and identity verification for remote gambling
New requirements to verify customers’ age earlier than 
previously required, and requirements to gather additional 
customer information.
2019
Figure 8 shows Gambling Commission consultations on regulatory changes
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3.10 The Commission undertakes enforcement activity to penalise non‑compliance 
with rules and deter licensed operators from deliberately or inadvertently failing to meet 
licence standards or codes of practice. This can result in formal sanctions, the most 
significant of which is to revoke an operator’s licence, and which also includes issuing 
fines, giving formal warnings and suspending licences. The Commission can also use 
regulatory settlements, where it agrees an appropriate financial penalty to be paid to 
a good cause related to gambling problems without the need to complete the formal 
legal process.
3.11 The Commission has increased enforcement actions against operators that break 
rules. Between April 2014 and March 2019, the Commission did the following:
• Revoked the licence of eight gambling businesses and eight senior individuals 
working in the industry.
• Enforced 29 financial penalties (7 fines and 22 regulatory settlements). The total 
number of penalties increased from three in 2014‑15 to nine in 2018‑19 (Figure 9). 
The value of these penalties also increased from a combined value of £1.4 million 
(average of £0.5 million per penalty) to £19.6 million (average of £2.2 million per 
penalty) over the same period. Most of the total figure comes from a small number 
of large penalties, and the Commission does not know the extent to which these 
increases have strengthened the deterrent effect of enforcement action.
Incentivising industry to go beyond minimum standards
3.12 Effective regulation not only penalises rule‑breaking, but also raises standards 
across the industry by incentivising and supporting companies to go beyond minimum 
requirements. Regulators can use their powers and insight to create the market 
conditions that influence operators to proactively improve how they treat customers 
and ensure that harm is minimised.
3.13 The Commission recognises that its licence conditions and codes of practice 
are a starting point, and it aims for operators to do more to treat customers well. 
The Commission uses various methods to influence operators to achieve this aim, 
for example organising workshops to share good practices and developing annual 
assurance statements for larger operators to complete and reflect on how they are 
treating their customers. Industry representatives we interviewed indicated that 
more clarity from the Commission about its expectations, and a more collaborative 
relationship, would help to raise standards.
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Fines 1 2 0 2 2
Regulatory settlements 2 3 3 7 7
 Total value of fines
and settlements (£000)
1,352 2,312 1,701 18,409 19,566
Note
1 Financial fi gures have not been adjusted for infl ation.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Gambling Commission data
Figure 9
Number and value of the Gambling Commission’s fines and regulatory settlements
Number of financial penalties Value of financial penalties (£000)
There has been an increase in the number and value of regulatory settlements since 2016-17
















Figure 9 shows Number and value of the Gambling Commission’s fines and regulatory settlements
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3.14 We found some common approaches other regulators use that the Commission 
has not introduced and could benefit from (Figure 10). In particular, it has not explored 
opportunities to create a competitive market that rewards operators that go beyond 
the minimum standards, for example by providing consumers with information and 
tools to identify operators that treat consumers fairly or where the risk of harm is lower. 
Information such as operators’ annual assurance statements or GamCare’s Safer 
Gambling Standard already exist, but the Commission has not considered how it might 
best support and use these to inform consumers and place reputational incentives on 
operators. The Commission has also not explored how it could place direct financial 
incentives or rewards, for example by reducing regulatory fees for operators that have 
gone beyond the minimum standards, under a revised funding model.
Figure 10
Gambling Commission’s use of regulatory methods to incentivise 
operators to treat consumers fairly
Method How used by other UK regulators Used by Gambling 
Commission?
Published guidance Publishing written explanations, such as 
regulatory guidance, explaining regulatory 
rules and how to comply with them. 
Yes – for example, the Gambling 
Commission’s (the Commission’s) 





Meeting companies and industry 
representatives to clarify expectations. 
This can include regulatory events, 
collaboration workshops and other 
joint working.
Yes – for example, small operator 
workshops or the Commission’s 




Communicating expectations of 
good practice through external 
communications, such as public 
speeches, blogs and webinars.
Yes – for example, public 




Information request for companies to 
demonstrate how they meet or exceed 
regulatory requirements.
Yes – mandatory annual 
assurance statements for larger 
operators that the Commission 
has run since 2015.
League tables or other 
public recognition of 
good practice
Ranking and publishing league tables 
of performance on treating customers 
fairly, or other public recognition of good 
practice such as blogs or awards. This 
would help consumers make informed 
choices on which provider to gamble with. 
No.
Financial incentives Financial incentives for desired 
behaviours, such as through licence or 
inspection fees or via price controls. 
No.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Gambling Commission interventions and approaches used by other regulators
Figure 10 shows Gambling Commission’s use of regulatory methods to incentivise operators to treat consumers fairly
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Working with others to make gambling safer
3.15 While the Commission has licensing objectives to protect consumers from harm, 
its direct role and powers are limited to regulating operators. It therefore works with 
other organisations to achieve its overall aims to ensure gambling is fair and safe. 
Safe gambling is an aspect of a well‑functioning market, and regulation is one of 
several tools that can be used to realise this goal. Other interventions include educating 
people about the risk of gambling‑related harms, and treating and supporting people 
who experience problems. Effective consumer protection also usually involves other 
functions, such as consumer advocacy and complaints services. The Commission 
works with other organisations that have related objectives to prevent or address 
gambling‑related harms: 
• The Commission has an established relationship with other regulatory 
organisations. For example, it works with the Committee of Advertising Practice 
and the Advertising Standards Authority to clarify operator requirements relating 
to gambling advertising.
• The Commission is also taking an increasingly proactive approach to engaging 
with organisations outside the regulatory framework. In 2019, it began working 
with the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute on a project to engage financial 
services firms with efforts to tackle gambling‑related harm, and has liaised with 
Public Health England on its review to better understand gambling‑related harms. 
One potential gap in the Commission’s wider engagement is the direct perspective 
of people who have been harmed by gambling problems. Unlike other regulators 
related to health and care, such as the Health and Care Professions Council which 
directly involves service users in a number of ways, the Commission does not 
have a mechanism to include the perspectives and experiences of recovered or 
recovering problem gamblers.
3.16 In April 2019, the Commission launched a three‑year national strategy to reduce 
gambling harms. This articulates how various activities from different organisations that 
aim to make gambling safer fit into an overall framework. This includes activities outside 
the Commission’s regulatory remit, such as the education or treatment of consumers. 
The Commission considered that there were benefits in a more collective approach, and 
took on responsibility to lead the development of the strategy in the absence of anything 
similar already existing. Although it is too early to evaluate the impact of this strategy, 
many stakeholders we interviewed welcomed the Commission’s efforts to bring key 
organisations together and take a more coherent approach.
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3.17 Within the regulatory arrangements as currently designed, consumers can seek 
redress when an operator does not fulfil its terms and conditions by complaining to 
one of eight industry‑funded dispute resolution services approved by the Commission. 
Consumers cannot typically seek redress from them in instances where operators have 
failed to abide by social responsibility codes of practice, for example requiring them to 
help consumers stop gambling for a defined period of time when the consumer requests 
this. There is also no statutory consumer representative organisation, as exists in some 
sectors. The Commission has therefore found it difficult to direct consumers seeking 
support to relevant organisations consistently. The Commission receives thousands of 
complaints each year from consumers, but plays no role in resolving them.
Measuring the effectiveness of gambling regulation
3.18 Regulators need a good understanding of their performance and impact so they 
can prioritise what works, take corrective action and be held accountable for their 
performance. Good performance measurement includes setting clear benchmarks to 
measure performance against, monitoring good‑quality data to assess performance, 
evaluating regulatory impact on key issues and reporting performance transparently 
to a range of stakeholders.5 Performance measurement is particularly challenging for 
regulators as they have limited control over their intended outcomes.
3.19 The Commission generally follows good practice in reporting performance to 
its board. It reports quarterly a set of indicators which are clearly linked to each of its 
strategic priorities, including protecting the interests of consumers and preventing 
harm to consumers and the public. Board performance reports include some external 
measures of consumer outcomes, such as estimated numbers of problem gamblers. 
They also include a narrative assessment which draws together the Commission’s 
achievements and the barriers to good performance.
3.20 We identified some weaknesses in the Commission’s approach to measuring 
its performance and impact. The outcomes it measures are not comprehensive 
and are mostly limited to survey data which measure the level of problem gambling. 
These metrics do not, for example, assess how well the Commission’s work reaches 
consumers it recognises to be most at risk (such as young men, ethnic minorities 
or vulnerable consumers). The performance measures are also not set against clear 
benchmarks or targets, which makes it difficult to measure how well the Commission 
is doing against its aims. The Commission undertakes some evaluation of its impact, 
although these are mostly limited examinations of whether its projects have been 
delivered as planned, with little assessment of the outcomes achieved, the timeliness 
of interventions or the effectiveness of industry‑led initiatives to protect consumers 
from harm. The Commission has identified this gap and is shifting the emphasis of its 
evaluations to focus on assessing the actual change achieved as a result of its activities.
5 National Audit Office, Performance measurement by regulators, November 2016.
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Part Four
Responding to social and technological change
4.1 Like many sectors, the gambling industry and the ways people gamble can change 
quickly, for example due to changing technologies and a significant increase in online 
and mobile gambling. When a regulated product or service experiences fast‑paced 
change, it is important that the regulation is able to respond to these changes and 
address emerging risks. 
4.2 This part therefore examines:
• whether the Gambling Commission (the Commission) has the powers and 
expertise it needs to understand and respond to changes in a timely manner; and
• whether the way that gambling regulation is funded ensures the Commission has 
the capacity and skills needed to address new risks it identifies.
Identifying and responding to changing risks
Understanding the impact of changes in the gambling industry 
4.3 Regulators need a good understanding of what is changing, and what risks 
or impacts on consumers result from these changes, in order to determine what 
regulatory response, if any, is needed. As well as new risks, technological changes 
can also lead to opportunities for better protections, such as ways to identify and 
support potential problem gamblers.
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4.4 The Commission monitors industry and consumer developments and trends, such 
as consumer participation rates and operators’ yield in different types of gambling, and 
public perceptions and attitudes towards gambling. It also uses data and analysis from 
other organisations, such as trends in advertising. From this work, it has identified a 
number of key developments that potentially give rise to new risks to consumers and 
affect how it regulates, including the following:
• Excluding the National Lottery, gambling licensed in Britain has grown by 57% 
(£4.1 billion) in real terms over the past decade, mostly due to a significant 
increase in online and mobile gambling. Between 2009 and 2019, operators’ 
yield from licensed online gambling increased from £1.0 billion to £5.3 billion in 
2019 prices, including a significant increase in November 2014 when all online 
gambling needed to be licensed (Figure 2 on page 16). In 2018, 44% of people 
who gambled online did so via a mobile phone, an increase from 23% in 2015.
• Social trends in how people gamble or interact with gambling change over 
time. For example, the amount that gambling operators spent on advertising 
and marketing increased by an estimated £558 million (56%) from 2014 to 2017, 
mostly due to increases of £347 million (87%) online and £107 million (255%) on 
social media (Figure 11). Betting on eSports and video games has also increased 
in popularity (in 2018, an estimated 16% of 18‑ to 24‑year‑olds reported having 
bet on eSports).
• The Commission also monitors new risks from areas that are not legally defined 
as gambling but share similar features, such as ‘loot boxes’ in video games that 
do not have prizes of monetary value and are therefore not regulated as gambling. 
Commentators have also expressed concern over casino‑style video games that 
do not involve financial transactions but might increase risks of people, particularly 
children, developing gambling addictions.
4.5 While the Commission has good awareness of changes in the industry, it has 
not yet assessed the impact or potential harms of many of these developments for 
consumers. For example, regulatory efforts to prevent operators from contacting at‑risk 
gamblers to encourage them to gamble more may be less successful if increases 
in gambling advertising have similar effects. Without a good understanding of these 
impacts, the Commission is unable to determine whether a regulatory response is 
needed, and what interventions would be most effective. In its most recent business 
plan, it has committed to work in partnership with the Advertising Standards Authority 
to review evidence on the impact of gambling advertising on children, young people 
and vulnerable people. The Commission has also recognised that it needs to increase 
its expertise in digital technologies, to better understand changes in the market and 
therefore to be able to respond quickly.
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Figure 11 shows Gambling advertising spend in Great Britain in 2014 and 2017
Powers to intervene in a timely manner 
4.6 As well as understanding what new interventions might be necessary, regulators 
also need to have the powers necessary to intervene in practice, for example by 
updating licence conditions.
4.7 Before 2014, the Commission had very limited powers over online gambling 
websites based outside Great Britain. Commentators identified this as a gap in the 
regulatory framework that led to potentially significant risks at least as far back as 2001, 
but it was not until 2014 that new legislation was passed to ensure the Commission 





Online marketing 400 747




Other offline advertising 94 70
Note
1 ‘Affi liates’ means marketing through content (for example, mobile phone apps and games) provided by other companies. ‘Other offl ine advertising’ 
includes billboards and newspaper adverts.
Source: Estimates produced by Regulus Partners
Figure 11
Gambling advertising spend in Great Britain in 2014 and 2017
Estimated advertising and marketing spend by gambling operators increased by 56% between 2014 and 2017
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4.8 The Commission’s statutory powers give it considerable scope to make changes 
to ensure the gambling licences it issues meet its objectives, including to protect 
consumers. The changes in 2014 therefore mean that, in effect, any commercial 
gambling provided in Great Britain is illegal except where explicitly licensed by the 
Commission (and local licensing authorities for gambling premises). Apart from specific 
areas that are reserved for the Secretary of State (such as setting licence fees, or 
stakes and prizes on gaming machines such as fixed‑odds betting terminals), it is up 
to the Commission to determine what operators need to do to ensure their licences 
are consistent with the licensing objectives of the 2005 Gambling Act.
4.9 In practice, the Commission does not always make changes itself, either because 
it lacks the powers to do so, or due to a lack of evidence over what the best regulatory 
response would be (paragraph 4.5) and what unintended consequences might 
result from potential interventions. Some changes have been made via legislation 
introduced by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and enacted 
by Parliament. A recent example of this was the 2019 reduction to the maximum 
stake gamblers can place on B2 machines (known as fixed‑odds betting terminals or 
FOBTs) from £100 per play to £2 per play. The Commission does not have powers to 
change stake limits on gambling machines, but it can take other actions to place new 
requirements on operators. It also provides formal advice, which government considers 
alongside other information. In 2013, the Commission advised government that there 
was “a serious case to answer in relation to B2 machines”, and that industry needed 
to urgently improve transparency and measures to minimise harm for consumers, but 
that there was not evidence to justify a large reduction to stakes limits. The Commission 
and DCMS introduced some new requirements on operators, seeking to reduce risks to 
consumers. Despite these new requirements, in 2018, five years after its previous formal 
advice, the Commission advised that there was now evidence of significant harm, which 
supported reduced stakes limits (Figure 12).
How gambling regulation is funded
4.10 In any sector, the way regulation is funded needs to be responsive to changing 
risks, so that regulators can continue to have the overall capacity they need to regulate 
effectively, and so that they can prioritise their resources on the most pressing issues.
4.11 The Commission received £19 million of funding in 2018‑19 (excluding for its 
National Lottery work). It is almost entirely funded by licence fees paid by gambling 
operators, as are local licensing activities. Licence fees are set by DCMS through 
regulations in secondary legislation, which normally happens approximately every 
four years. The current licence fee model was determined in 2016 and enacted in 
2017, and sets fees for each of the 39 specific types of licence and also by the size 
of each gambling operator based on their gross gambling yield (bets placed less 
winnings paid out).6
6 There are 37 types of operator licence (such as online casinos, premises‑based bingo or gambling machines) and 
2 types of personal licence (covering key management roles and a range of functional roles, particularly where they 
involve handling cash). The vast majority of licence fee income (96% in 2018‑19) comes from operator licences.
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Figure 12 shows Timeline of interventions regarding fixed‑odds betting terminals
Figure 12
Timeline of interventions regarding fi xed‑odds betting terminals
There were six years between the Gambling Commission (the Commission) advising of the potential 
for significant harm and legislative changes to reduce stakes limits taking effect
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
January 2003 – Ministerial Statement
In a written Ministerial Statement on 8 January 2003, 
the government expressed “concern” at the “increasing 
installation” of B2 machines (known as fixed‑odds betting 
terminals or FOBTs) in licensed betting offices and that 
this “risk[ed] seriously increasing problem gambling”.
2003
2005 April 2005 – B2 machines regulated
FOBTs came within the scope of regulation through 
the Gambling Act 2005, which came into force in 
September 2007.
2013 June 2013 – Advice to government
The Commission provided formal advice to government 
as part of the Triennial Review of Gaming Machine 
Stakes and Prizes, which acknowledged that there was 
a “serious case” to answer in relation to FOBTs but said 
a precautionary reduction in stakes was “unsupported 
by the available evidence”.
2018 February 2018 – Advice to government 
The Commission provided formal advice to government 
to support its review of gaming machines and social 
responsibility measures, which contained a package of 
recommendations. It concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence of harm and recommended FOBT stake limits 
of £2 for slots and no greater than £30 for non‑slots.
2019 April 2019 – £2 maximum stake took effect 
The maximum stake took effect from 1 April 2019.
2015–
2016
2015-16 – Licence conditions and regulations changed
DCMS and the Commission consulted on and made 
changes to licence conditions, codes of practice and 
regulations including:
• requiring customers to be authorised by operator 
staff to play on FOBTs at stakes of £50 or more;
• requiring that customers are able to set time or 
spend thresholds that, if exceeded, trigger alerts 
to themselves or operator staff; and
• ensuring gaming machines are not the primary 
function of a gambling premises, and that a 
substantive proportion of the gambling services 
it provides has to be non‑gaming machines.
November 2003 – Code of Practice
The Gaming Board (now Gambling Commission) took 
the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB), the trade 
association, to court over the regulation of FOBTs. They 
settled out of court but agreed on a code of practice 
in November 2003, which set the maximum prize and 
stake on FOBTs at £500 and £100 respectively.
2003
June 2006 – ABB report
ABB followed up the report it produced in April 2005 
for the then Department for Culture, Media & Sport 
(DCMS) on the association of problem gambling and 
FOBT users, which said that FOBTs were “not more 
associated with problem gambling than any other 
form or forms of gambling”.
2006
October 2017 – Proposals announced
In October 2017, DCMS consulted on a range of proposals 
to strengthen protections around gambling. These 
included lowering the maximum stake on FOBTs to 
between £50 and £2.
2017
May 2018 – Maximum stake announced
On 17 May 2018, DCMS announced that the maximum 
stake on all FOBT games would be lowered to £2.
2018
October 2013 – Triennial Review Response
In its response to the Triennial Review, DCMS recognised 
the potential for harm from playing on FOBTs and 
acknowledged the “very significant public concern”. 
However, there “was little material based on robust evidence 
received from those concerned about the social impact 
of B2 machines”. While it was clear that reducing stakes 
on FOBTs would have an adverse economic impact 
on the betting industry, the government said it was not 
clear how great an impact a reduction would have on 
gambling‑related harm.
2013
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4.12 DCMS and the Commission intend for licence fees to reflect the costs of licensing 
and regulating the industry. This cost is based on an assessment of the level of risk of 
each licence type and size of operator, but the way risk is defined can become quickly 
out of date. The latest fees review was in 2016 and was based on the Commission’s 
best estimates at the time. Both the complexity of the industry and the Commission’s 
understanding of digital technologies have developed since then, particularly regarding 
online and mobile gambling, which account for 83% of the total number of regulatory 
fines and settlements in the past five years. However, while the Commission has been 
able to articulate these increasing challenges, it has not yet fully assessed what impact 
they have and therefore what the regulatory needs will be going forward.
4.13 The way that gambling regulation is funded does not allow the Commission 
to change licence fees or otherwise raise additional resource outside of secondary 
legislation. As changes have typically been a few years apart, they have involved a 
major fee review. Current legislation means that a new statutory instrument is required 
each time a change is needed so that extra funding can be raised in specific areas, 
or overall. The Commission also faces more general constraints in being able to move 
resources to where they are most needed (for example, in re‑deploying staff if they do 
not have the right skills or expertise).
4.14 These constraints make it more difficult for the Commission to invest in 
addressing specific skills gaps it has identified, including in crypto‑currency and 
addictive technologies. It has therefore attempted to manage the gaps, for example 
by using voluntary external expertise on its Digital Advisory Board. However, some 
of the skills gaps the Commission has identified relate to its ability to regulate many 
types of gambling. The Commission has not yet explored whether it could do more 
to reprioritise its work where it identifies a need to do so.
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 This study examined the extent to which gambling regulation effectively and 
proportionately protects people from gambling‑related harms and addresses emerging 
risks. It focuses on the role and work of the Gambling Commission (the Commission), 
but also considers the wider regulatory framework it operates within. In particular, 
we examined whether the Commission:
•	 has a good understanding of the problems it is trying to address, and has clearly 
set out what it is trying to achieve, so it can direct resources effectively (Part Two);
•	 is both intervening directly and working effectively with others to make gambling 
safer, based on a good understanding of what works (Part Three); and
•	 has the powers, capacity and expertise it needs to address emerging risks and 
respond to social and technological changes (Part Four).
2 While we considered the Commission’s overall approach and various objectives 
as part of this review, our evaluation focuses on its objective to protect children and 
other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling.7 We assessed 
the Commission against established principles of good regulation as well as other 
recent work we have done on accountability and reporting in government, for example 
our 2016 guidance on regulatory performance measurement.8
3 We have not examined the merits of government’s policy objectives in this area, 
only the extent to which gambling regulation supports these objectives. We have also 
not audited non‑regulatory interventions by other organisations, such as treatment 
services for gambling addiction, although we have considered these factors in context.
4 Our audit approach is summarised in Figure 13 on pages 42 and 43. Our evidence 
base is described in Appendix Two.
7 Some headline figures in our report exclude the National Lottery where appropriate, as the Commission has separate 
objectives relating to the operation of this.
8 National Audit Office, Performance measurement by regulators, November 2016
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Figure 13 shows our audit approach
Figure 13
Our audit approach
The objective of 
government






(see Appendix Two 
for details)
• Analysed data, 
information and research 
on the scale and nature of 
problem gambling.
• Interviewed officials from the 
Commission and its board.
• Reviewed documents 
provided by the Commission.
• Reviewed online 
discussion forums. 
• Interviewed stakeholders 
including DCMS, Public 
Health England, charities, 
professional bodies and 
academics. 
•  Benchmarked against stated 
good practice or reasonable 
comparators where available.
• Reviewed publicly available 
information on the social and 
technological changes taking 
place within the industry. 
• Interviewed officials from the 
Commission and its board.
• Interviewed stakeholders 
including industry, officials 
from DCMS, licensing 
authorities, charities and 
relevant government bodies. 
• Analysed data and 
information on the 
industry, including licence 
fees, gambling yield and 
advertising spend.
• Reviewed examples of 
Commission interventions on 
a case study basis.
The Commission has a good 
understanding of the problems it 
is trying to address, and is clear 
about what it is trying to achieve 
in addressing them.
The Commission has the 
powers, capacity and expertise 
it needs to address emerging 
risks and respond to social and 
technological changes.
The Commission intervenes 
effectively and proportionately 
to minimise problem gambling, 
based on a good understanding 
of what works.
• Interviewed officials from the 
Commission and its board.
• Analysed data and information 
on enforcement activity and 
intelligence, including local 
premises inspections and 
consumer complaints.
• Interviewed stakeholders 
including consumer and 
industry representatives, 
academics and a range of 
organisations that work with 
the Commission.
• Reviewed management 
information and documents 
from the Commission.
• Reviewed examples of 
Commission interventions on 
a case study basis.
• Benchmarked against stated 
good practice or reasonable 
comparators where available.
The Gambling Commission (the Commission) is the statutory regulator of gambling operators that provide gambling 
in Great Britain. Its overall aim is to ensure gambling is fair and safe, and the statutory objectives of its licensing and 
regulation include protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling. 
The Commission is sponsored by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS), which seeks to 
ensure commercial gambling is socially responsible.
The Commission regulates gambling operators through a combination of licensing, compliance and enforcement 
activities. For example, it sets the rules that operators must follow, supervises operators’ conduct and enforces 
penalties or other sanctions where an operator has broken the rules. The Commission also works with a number 
of other public, private and charitable bodies that seek to make gambling safer, including researchers, educational 
organisations and treatment providers.
This study assessed the extent to which gambling regulation effectively and proportionately protects people from 
gambling‑related harms and addresses emerging risks, based on established principles of good regulation. It focused 
on the role and work of the Commission, but also considered the wider regulatory framework it operates within.
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Gambling‑related harm is a serious problem for the individual affected and people close to them. It imposes 
potentially significant costs on public services and society more widely, although government has a limited 
understanding of these impacts. The Gambling Commission is a small regulator in a challenging and dynamic 
industry. To reduce these harms, it has increased its regulatory action (such as penalties on operators that break 
rules) and its collaboration with others in the field. But there is more it needs to do to identify where problems are 
occurring and ensure gambling operators raise their standards. The way people gamble is changing, with new risks 
emerging in online and mobile gambling and other technological developments. The Commission’s ability to ensure 
consumers are protected from these new risks is constrained by factors outside its control, including inflexible 
funding and a lack of evidence on how developments in the industry affect consumers. The Commission is unlikely 
to be fully effective in addressing risks and harms to consumers within the current arrangements.
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 We reached our independent conclusions on the effectiveness of gambling 
regulation in protecting people from gambling‑related harms by analysing evidence 
collected between July and November 2019. 
2 We applied an analytical framework with evaluative criteria to our analysis, 
which considered: how the Gambling Commission (the Commission) gathers 
insights into the key issues consumers face and clearly sets out what it is trying to 
achieve; whether the Commission’s interventions are effective, proportionate and 
based on an understanding of what works; and the extent to which the Commission 
has the capacity and capability it needs to address emerging risks in the market. 
Our analytical framework was based on:
• established principles of good regulation, such as those identified in the 
2005 Hampton review;9
• standards identified in other published guidance such as the National Audit Office’s 
(NAO’s) 2016 guidance on regulatory performance measurement, which illustrates 
the importance of regulators setting clear objectives and measuring performance 
against these;10 and 
• evaluative approaches we have developed and used in previous assessments 
of regulators and regulatory frameworks. Our audit approach is outlined in 
Appendix One.
3 We conducted several semi-structured interviews with representatives 
from the Commission (including board members) and the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) to inform our audit. We also met with a range of 
other organisations to gather perspectives, experiences and evidence across all 
our study areas. We interviewed representatives from the following organisations:
• Regulatory and enforcement organisations: Advertising Standards Authority; 
Competition and Markets Authority; Independent Betting Adjudication Service; 
Leeds City Council.
9 National Audit Office, Hampton Implementation Reviews – Guidance for Review Teams, March 2008.
10 National Audit Office, Performance measurement by regulators, November 2016.
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• Other public and charitable bodies: Citizens Advice; GambleAware; GamCare; 
Gordon Moody Association; Local Government Association; Young Gamers and 
Gambling Education Trust; Money and Mental Health Policy Institute; NHS England; 
Public Health England.
• Industry representative organisations: Bacta; Bingo Association; Gambling 
Business Group; Industry Group for Responsible Gambling; National Casino 
Forum; Remote Gambling Association; Senet Group.
• Other stakeholders, including academic experts: Advisory Board for Safer 
Gambling; Regulus Partners; London School of Economics. 
4 To examine whether the Commission has a good understanding of the 
problems it is trying to address and has clearly set out what it is trying to 
achieve, we did the following:
• Analysed secondary evidence, including published research reports from the 
Commission and other organisations on the nature and scale of gambling 
prevalence among adults and children. When examining the prevalence of 
gambling harm, we used figures from the Gambling Commission’s 2016 
gambling participation report and the Young People and Gambling Survey 2019, 
these being the latest full estimates available for each of the groups. Different data 
and methodologies are used in these reports, reflecting the different nature of the 
survey populations. In some parts of our report, we have combined the prevalence 
figures from the two reports to produce an indicative overall estimate. As the 
16‑year‑old age bracket can appear in both surveys, there may be an element 
of double‑counting, but this is likely to be very small compared with the overall 
uncertainty in the estimates.
• Reviewed online discussion forums (for example, on gambling charity websites) 
to identify illustrative examples of common issues that consumers report and the 
types of detriment they experience. We did not seek to validate the testimony of 
each forum entry, and have based our analysis on what consumers reported to 
provide a case study example of the consumer perspective.
• Examined published documents and internal management information on the 
Commission’s aims and objectives.
• Reviewed literature and other secondary evidence on the causes and impacts 
of gambling harm.
• Drew on evidence from our previous report Tackling problem debt, particularly 
comparisons regarding the types of data and evidence regulators have to measure 
the long‑term impacts of consumer harm.11
11 Comptroller and Auditor General, Tackling problem debt, Session 2017–2019, HC 1499, National Audit Office, 
September 2018.
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5 To examine how the Commission intervenes in the market, and assess 
whether this is effective, proportionate and based on what works, we did 
the following:
• Reviewed published and unpublished Commission documentation relating to its 
licensing, compliance and enforcement activities. For example, we reviewed the 
Commission’s consultations on regulatory changes since 2015, industry workshops 
and external communications.
• Undertook primary analysis of Commission data on intelligence submissions, 
licensing authority inspections, licence revocations, and the number and value 
of financial penalties.
• Examined as case study examples two changes to the Licence Conditions and 
Codes of Practice from 2018‑19, relating to terms and practices regarding online 
bonus promotions in the sector and how operators interact with customers. 
This included using desk research, review of the Commission’s documents 
and interviews with stakeholders (including some written evidence submissions).
• Reviewed Commission management information, including internal governance 
board meeting minutes and recent Audit and Risk Committee meeting papers. 
This included documentation relating to how the Commission works and shares 
information with other organisations to achieve its aims, for example its national 
strategy to reduce gambling harms and documents relating to ongoing projects 
with external organisations, and how it measures and reports performance.
• Drew on our past work on other regulators and regulated sectors to identify 
reasonable comparators. Benchmarked the Commission against comparators 
where available, or otherwise against defined good‑practice criteria with regards 
to consumer redress, incentivising best practice among regulated firms, and 
measuring and reporting performance. Drew on knowledge of other regulatory 
sectors with regards to consumer redress and incentivising best practice among 
regulated firms. In particular, we used previous NAO studies relating to regulating 
to protect consumers across different sectors.
• Analysed the Commission’s performance information and reporting against 
established good‑practice criteria.
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6 To assess whether the Commission has the powers, capacity and expertise 
it needs to address emerging risks and respond to social and technological 
changes, we did the following:
• Reviewed secondary information and research from a range of sources on recent 
social and technological developments in the gambling industry, and in some 
cases conducted further analysis. This included examining changes in the size 
and structure of the industry (for example, through analysis of gross gambling yield) 
and trends in gambling advertising.
• Examined the Commission’s funding, including the current gambling licence fee 
model. This involved analysing licence fee data, and reviewing what restrictions 
or opportunities the current model places on the regulator. We also compared 
the funding arrangements with how regulation is funded in some other sectors.
• Examined the Commission’s understanding and analysis of its own capability 
and capacity, particularly regarding digital technologies and online gambling.
• Reviewed legislation relevant to the Commission, to understand what statutory 
powers it has and how these have changed over time.
• Reviewed the timeliness of a number of recent interventions in the gambling 
market made in response to developments within the sector, including a case 
study on the regulatory response to high stakes games on B2 machines 
(known as fixed‑odds betting terminals). 
• Reviewed written submissions from stakeholders on the timeliness of the 
Commission’s interventions.
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